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Lubanga and Haradinaj: The Danger 
of Expediency in International 
Criminal Trials 
Heidi L. Hansberry* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi 
Brahimaj (Haradinaj) at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (Lubanga) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) illustrate 
several challenges faced by international tribunals.  First, these cases 
demonstrate that international tribunals must balance the dual 
priorities of expediency and the protection of those involved with the 
proceedings.  A second, related challenge that these cases reveal is 
the difficulty of preserving a trial chamber’s1 discretionary authority 
while simultaneously limiting the abuse of power and maintaining 
fair and expeditious proceedings. 
Recent actions by judges in international tribunals indicate 
that judges tend to consider any reason for delay as unjustified and to 
be avoided at all costs in order to promote trial expediency.  This 
article seeks to show that delays concerning the protection of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, expected May 2012, Northwestern University School 
of Law.  Heidi Hansberry completed a Northwestern University School of Law 
International Externship at the International Criminal Court during the fall of 
2010.  The views expressed in this article are strictly her own.  She wishes to thank 
Ambassador and Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law David 
Scheffer, who provided invaluable guidance and feedback throughout all stages of 
this article. 
1 The trial chamber is the component of the ICC and ICTY tasked with conducting 
trials, as distinct from the pre-trial chamber and the appeals chamber. 
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individuals involved in court proceedings2 must be viewed 
differently, as the Haradinaj Appeals Chamber correctly observes.  
If a court will not ensure the safety of those involved, witnesses and 
others will be less likely to come forward and be truthful, and the 
trial will be severely handicapped.  Thus, this article will argue that 
the urge to rush matters regarding protection must be tamed. 
Following a background section, Part One of this article will 
analyze the protection dilemmas encountered by the Haradinaj and 
Lubanga courts.  Next, it will explain the legal basis for the 
discretionary decisions made by the respective trial chambers, 
namely the Haradinaj Trial Chamber’s refusal to delay proceedings 
to accommodate witnesses with protection concerns and the 
Lubanga Trial Chamber’s stay of proceedings, which resulted from a 
stalemate between the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor regarding 
witness protection issues. 
Part Two of this article will explain the significance of the 
trial chambers’ discretion and describe how it can both achieve and 
undermine goals related to the protection of individuals involved 
with the tribunals.  This section will closely analyze the different 
outcomes of the protection issues in Haradinaj and Lubanga and the 
implications of the trial chambers’ decisions. 
Part Three of this article will evaluate the appeals chambers’ 
effectiveness in resolving the issues presented in the two cases.  It 
will argue that the Haradinaj Appeals Chamber took a strong stance 
against the Trial Chamber’s abuse of discretion and, therefore, 
provided clear guidance regarding the conduct of trial chambers in 
relation to witness protection.  The appeals decision in Lubanga, 
however, did little to clarify how the Trial Chamber ought to handle 
protection disagreements in the future.  In part because the issue was 
not ripe, the Appeals Chamber did not address the Lubanga Trial 
Chamber’s discretion in the context of protection, nor did it assign 
weight to the competing concerns of expediency and the protection 
of individuals involved with the court proceedings.   
Part Four will conclude that protection of witnesses and 
others involved in the court proceedings should trump concerns 
about expediency because the lack of adequate and timely protective 
measures could lead to a variety of undesirable and ironic 
repercussions.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 Throughout this article, this phrase will collectively refer to defense witnesses, 
prosecution witnesses, and dual status victim-witnesses. 
?
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Issue of Expediency 
1. Statistics regarding the pace of international criminal trials 
There have been no completed trials to date at the ICC, 
which was born upon the Rome Statute’s entry into force on July 1, 
2002.3  Statistics reflect that an accused person spends an average of 
2.3 years awaiting trial at the ICC while in custody.4  The average 
time period between custody and a decision on charges, the first step 
toward a trial at the ICC, alone is 0.9 years.5  Similarly, the time 
period between Bahr Idriss Abu Garda’s voluntary appearance and 
the decision on charges was 0.7 years.6  Thus, it is typical that an 
exceedingly long period of time elapses before the trial itself 
begins—even for those defendants who appear voluntarily.  And 
although no trials have concluded at the ICC, the first two trials 
promise to be lengthy.  At the time of writing, the trial of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo has been underway for over two years, since January 
26, 2009, and the trial of Germain Katanga and Matheiu Ngudjolo 
Chui, which began on November 24, 2009, approaches its two-year 
anniversary.7 
The ICTY’s statistics are similar to those of the ICC, in spite 
of the fact that the ICTY was established much earlier, in May 
1993,8 and that it has completed many more trials, 126 to date.9  The 
average duration of an ICTY trial is 1.4 years, and the pre-trial phase 
lasts approximately 1.9 years.10   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 126, opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] 
(entered into force July 1, 2002). 
4 See Annex 1, a table with data regarding the length of time between the major 
events in trials at the ICC, current through July 12, 2011. 
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 See About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited 
July 24, 2011).  
9 See Key Figures, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited July 
24, 2011). 
10 Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Trials, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
79, 117 (2009); see also Maximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial 
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These statistics are not unique to the ICC and ICTY.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also have lengthy trials (an average 
of 2.2 years and 3.5 years, respectively) and long pre-trial phases (an 
average of 3.6 years and 1.4 years, respectively).11  Even more 
shocking is the average length of time between custody and the 
ultimate judgment: 4.7 years (ICTY), 5.9 years (ICTR), and 4.8 
years (SCSL).12 
2. Causes of the slow pace and proposed solutions  
Stating that lengthy proceedings are the biggest problem of 
international criminal trials, Robert Heinsch enumerated six main 
reasons for the slow pace of international criminal trials.13  First, the 
enormous amount of disclosed material overburdens the defense.14  
Second, the Office of the Prosecutor should, but does not, facilitate 
the work of the defense by structuring its disclosures and 
streamlining its cases, so as to create less labor for the defense.15  
Faced with more work, the defense often requests time extensions, a 
big contributor to the slow pace of proceedings.16   Heinsch’s third 
point is that judges are not proactive enough in encouraging 
cooperation between the parties.17  Fourth, judges are hindered by a 
lack of information on the background of cases; most significantly, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 36 YALE  J. INT'L L. 241, 253 (2010) (Using 
statistics current through July, 2006: “The median length of the pre-trial phase is 
about 18 months (551 days). The trial phase with guilty pleas included has a 
median length of about 14 months (433 days), while the trial phase without guilty 
pleas has a median length of about 17 months (515 days).”). 
11 See Gailbraith, supra note 10, at 117. 
12 Id. Note that there is often a substantial amount of time that elapses after an 
accused individual is taken into custody prior to his or her initial appearance at the 
tribunal (i.e. the commencement of the pre-trial phase).  See Langer & Doherty, 
supra note 10, at 253–54. 
13 Robert Heinsch, How to achieve fair and expeditious trial proceedings before 
the ICC: Is it time for a more judge-dominated approach?, in THE EMERGING 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 480, 481 (Carsten Stahn & 
Göran Sluiter, eds., 2009).  
14 Id. at 483. 
15 Id. at 485–86, 491. 
16 Id. at 486. 
17 Id. at 487–88.  
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they lack awareness of exculpatory material.18  Fifth, self-
represented defendants, rather than experienced attorneys, are 
allowed to participate in international criminal trials, causing 
unnecessary delays about basic issues.19  Sixth, the participation of 
victims throws off the equilibrium of a typical trial, and, absent a 
proactive bench, delays ensue.20   
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Summarizing the difficulty in finding a solution to the slow 
pace of international criminal tribunals, Jean Galbraith noted that 
there are two typical, yet problematic strategies, which often conflict 
with each other and with the primary objectives of these tribunals.21  
The first strategy is to abbreviate historical record-building efforts 
and to devote less time to helping transitioning societies achieve 
peace.22  The second strategy is to speed up procedural aspects of 
trial, which creates due process concerns.23  Galbraith disagreed with 
these strategies and suggested plea bargaining and multi-defendant 
trials as the proper solutions to the slow pace of the international 
criminal legal system.24 
The ICTY has also targeted the problem of pace.  Its attempts 
to shorten trials and expedite proceedings, however, have had ironic 
results, according to one report.25  In its implementation of so-called 
managerial reforms, the ICTY actually lengthened the average 
duration of proceedings, according to the report’s analysis.26  These 
managerial reforms included, inter alia, allowing judges to actively 
manage the pre-trial and trial phases, permitting more written 
witness statements in lieu of live testimony, granting trial chambers 
the authority to permit or reject applications for interlocutory 
appeals, and limiting, at the trial stage, the number of sites and 
incidents under review.27  This same analysis showed that the 
reductions in the duration of trial that did occur were not due to 
procedural reforms, but rather resulted from increases in court 
?
18 Id. at 488. 
19 Id. at 494. 
20 Id. at 495. 




25 Langer & Doherty, supra note 10. 
26 Id. at 252. 
27 Id. at 251.  
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capacity and plea-bargaining.28  Thus, the report showed that “the 
procedural reforms that aimed to shorten procedure had the opposite 
effect: lengthening both pre-trial and trial.”29   
Many of these observations imply concrete ways to improve 
international courts with strategies that eliminate unnecessary delays.  
It is important to note that delays caused by witness protection are 
not listed above, and this article will argue that they are in a category 
of their own.  Unlike delays caused by inefficient procedures or lack 
of cooperation among the parties and participants, delays concerning 
the protection of individuals involved with court proceedings are not 
properly handled with impatience or haste.  These types of delays are 
necessary for the fairness of trials and the optimal functioning of the 
court system.  Discounting the safety and security of witnesses will 
not necessarily assist courts in overcoming criticism about their slow 
pace, especially when there are many other causes of delays that are 
unrelated to witness protection.  
B. Cases 
1. Haradinaj 
 Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj are 
accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to 
commit crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and 
customs of war as members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 
which persecuted and abducted Serbian, Kosovar Roma/Egyptian, 
and Kosavar Albanian citizens.30  Collectively, the allegations 
against all three include harassment, deportation or forcible transfers 
of civilians, cruel treatment, murder, rape, and torture.31  Haradinaj 
was allegedly the de facto commander of the KLA.32  Balaj was 
allegedly a member of the KLA and the commander of a special unit 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
28 Id. at 259.  
29 Id. at 243. 
30 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-
04-84-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 3 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Haradinaj et al. 
Appeal Judgment].  
31 See ICTY website, Case Information Sheet for Haradinaj et al., available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/cis/en/cis_haradinaj_al_en.pdf. 
32 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 2. 
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called the Black Eagles.33  Lahi was allegedly a deputy commander 
and finance director for the KLA.34   
 The Haradinaj trial commenced at the ICTY on March 5, 
2007, and the Trial Chamber’s judgment was delivered on April 3, 
2008.35  The Trial Chamber found insufficient evidence for the 
charge of JCE among the three defendants.  All of the defendants 
were acquitted of the various charges, with the exception of 
Brahimaj, who was found guilty of torture.36  The prosecution filed 
an appeal on May 2, 2008, claiming that the Trial Chamber abused 
its discretion by violating the prosecution’s right to a fair trial by 
dismissing its requests for more time to obtain the testimony of a 
witness reluctant to testify because of alleged intimidation.37  The 
appeals decision was delivered on July 21, 2010, in which a partial 
re-trial was ordered for all defendants concerning the charges of 
JCE.38  
2. Lubanga 
 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is on trial at the ICC for war crimes, 
specifically enlisting and conscripting child soldiers in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  Lubanga is allegedly the 
founder and former President of the Union des Patriotes 
Congolais (UPC), as well as the founder and former commander-in-
chief of the UPC’s military branch, the Forces patriotiques pour la 
libération du Congo (FPLC).39  The UPC/FPLC is described as a 
hierarchically-organized, armed group participating in the ongoing 
hostilities in the DRC.40   
 Lubanga’s trial began on January 26, 2009.41  The stay of the 




35See ICTY website, supra note 31. 
36 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 481. 
37 Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. 
38 Id. ¶ 50. 
39See ICC website, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases 
/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/demo
cratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo. 
40 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/01-04/06, ¶¶ 3–4 
(Apr. 3, 2006). 
41See ICC website, supra note 39. 
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the appeals decision on the stay of proceedings was delivered on 
October 8, 2010.42   
III. PART ONE: PROTECTION DILEMMAS IN HARADINAJ AND LUBANGA 
A. Dissection of the Dilemmas Encountered by the Haradinaj and 
Lubanga Courts 
 The trial chambers of the ICTY and the ICC were in the same 
no-win situation when faced with dilemmas concerning the 
protection of individuals involved with their courts.  They were 
forced to choose between an expeditious trial that compromised the 
needs of witnesses involved in the trial and a delayed trial that 
accommodated these individual needs.  Both trial chambers chose to 
expedite proceedings, a choice that was dismissive of the security 
concerns of those involved in the trials.  
In Haradinaj, two witnesses refused to testify before the 
Trial Chamber, citing intimidation and fear in relation to testifying.43  
The prosecution claimed that these witnesses possessed crucial 
information concerning the accused and that it needed more time to 
secure their testimony.44  The Trial Chamber denied the 
prosecution’s requests for more time extensions, noting that the 
prosecution had already exceeded its time limit for the presentation 
of its case.45  The prosecution later argued that the Trial Chamber 
“rewarded witness intimidation” and prohibited a fair trial by 
refusing to allow for more time in order to secure the testimony of 
these witnesses and for not taking steps to facilitate or compel their 
testimony.46  Further, the prosecution argued that the absence of 
these two witnesses’ testimonies resulted in the acquittals of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
42The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2582, 
Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I 
of 8 July 2010 Entitled, “Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for 
Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or 
Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU” 
(Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor]. 
43 The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. 
IT-04-84-A 540-483, Prosecution Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 3 
(July 17, 2008). 
44 Id. ¶ 5. 
45 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
46 Id. ¶¶ 4–5.  
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accused.47  The prosecution criticized the Trial Chamber for 
choosing an expeditious trial over a fair one.48   
 Similarly, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga made a choice 
between two problematic options with regard to the disclosure of the 
identity of a person affiliated with the prosecution, referred to as 
Intermediary 143.  Intermediaries are individuals affiliated with the 
prosecution who work in the field to assist alleged child soldiers in 
filling out victim application materials and who introduce these 
children to prosecution investigators.49  The defense insisted that the 
disclosure of the identity of Intermediary 143 was essential for the 
examination of a witness in the defense’s abuse of process claim.50  
This abuse of process claim involved the accusation that 
intermediaries, in collaboration with the prosecution, coached 
witnesses to provide false testimony.51 
The prosecution opposed the disclosure of Intermediary 
143’s identity for several reasons.52  The prosecution argued that, 
from a policy perspective, disclosure would inhibit the prosecution’s 
ability to effectively gather information from dangerous locations if 
it could not guarantee the protection of the identities of 
intermediaries.53  The prosecution also emphasized that disclosure 
would negatively impact the Intermediary’s career and professional 
credibility because of the nature of the defense team’s allegations.54  
Most importantly, the prosecution argued that the safety and security 
of Intermediary 143 would be at risk if his identity was revealed, in 
part due to the type of allegations and also because “living where 
they live…[intermediaries] are at real, documented risk on account 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
47 Id. ¶ 4. 
48 Id. ¶ 3. 
49 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-
Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ¶ 15 (May 31, 2010). 
50Id. ¶ 143. 
51Id. ¶ 25, quoting Defense Counsel Maitre Mabille: “The Defence also intend to 
show that some of this false testimony was fabricated with the assistance of 
intermediaries who collaborated with the Office of the Prosecutor” (Transcript of 
Hearing on 27 January 2010, at 20–22, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-236-CONF-ENG ET (Jan. 27, 2010)); see also 
Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶ 4. 
52 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-
Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ¶¶ 58, 62, 66 (May 31, 2010).  
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
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of the activities they undertake for the OTP [Office of the 
Prosecutor] and for other organs of the Court.”55   
 Seemingly in agreement with the prosecution’s assessment of 
the risks associated with revealing the intermediary’s identity, the 
Trial Chamber initially ordered that the disclosure occur only after 
protection measures were implemented.56  The Chamber reiterated 
its requirement that protective measures be put in place prior to 
disclosure in its rejection of the prosecution’s request to appeal the 
disclosure of Intermediary 143:  
[A] court will strive not to treat individuals who are 
affected by the work of the Court unfairly (as 
demonstrated by the Chamber’s insistence that the 
necessary protective measures are implemented prior 
to disclosure of intermediary 143’s identity) . . . the 
Chamber recognizes that in certain circumstances, the 
treatment of particular individuals (e.g. the accused, 
victims or witnesses) may have a significant impact 
on the overall fairness of the proceedings.57 
When the Trial Chamber discovered that the implementation of these 
protection measures would require a time delay, however, the Trial 
Chamber chose to order the disclosure to a more limited group of 
defense team members rather than to await the implementation of the 
protection measures.58   
The Trial Chamber thus revealed its priority to keep the 
proceedings running without delay, even though the prosecution, 
consistent with its earlier position, insisted that Intermediary 143 
must be protected by the Court before his identity was revealed.59  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
55 Id. ¶ 18. 
56 Id. ¶ 139(d) (“Disclosure of the identity of the intermediary . . . is not to be 
effected until there has been an assessment by the VWU, and any protective 
measures that are necessary have been put in place.”). 
57 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2463, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on 
Intermediaries,” ¶ 30 (June 4, 2010). 
58 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-
Red, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the 
Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay 
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU (July 8, 2010) 
[hereinafter Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request]. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 7–8.  
?
 2011] H E I D I  L .  H A N S B E R R Y  367
The prosecution in Lubanga held this position in spite of the 
repeated orders of disclosure by the Trial Chamber.60  The 
prosecution’s noncompliance with these orders caused the Trial 
Chamber to issue a stay of the Lubanga trial.61 
B. The No-Win Nature of these Dilemmas 
The Haradinaj and Lubanga courts had two options.  The 
first option was to delay the respective trials in order to cater to the 
needs of at-risk individuals, ensuring their safety in spite of the loss 
of time.  The second option was to continue with the proceedings, 
given that the length of time required for the resolution of the 
concerned individuals’ problems was uncertain, and the trials could 
be stalled for an unknown period of time.   
 If judges chose to delay proceedings, they would cause 
several unfavorable results.  First, delaying the proceedings would 
likely lengthen the overall trial, resulting in additional operating 
costs.  Second, delays potentially infringe upon the accused’s right to 
an expeditious trial.  Third, if delaying the proceedings would be 
perceived as elective or voluntary, doing so may exacerbate criticism 
that international criminal proceedings are unnecessarily lengthy, 
which could reduce public support for international tribunals.62 
 This article argues that the second possible course of action, 
expediting proceedings, would have even greater consequences.  If a 
chamber refused a time extension for the implementation of 
protective measures, it could cause a frightened witness to refuse to 
testify.  The absence of witness testimony could prevent a critical 
component of a party’s case, and the party would, therefore, have 
ammunition for an appeal.  Ironically, an appeal of this type could 
lengthen the proceedings more than the delay at issue.   
Another danger resulting from expediting the proceedings in 
the context of witness protection is that other witnesses may be 
deterred from cooperating with courts if they believe they will not be 
adequately protected.  A third possible consequence is that deficient 
protective measures could put the lives and safety of witnesses and 
their families at risk.  If a witness were harmed as a result of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
60 Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 
61 Id. ¶ 31.  
62 See Heinsch, supra note 13, at 481.  
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testifying, a court would lose credibility in its claim to provide for 
and prioritize its witnesses’ security.  
C. The Legal Basis for the Trial Chambers’ Actions 
1. General authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial 
Article 20(1) of the Statute of the ICTY states that “The Trial 
Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that 
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure 
and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”63  Nearly 
identical is Article 64 of the ICC’s Rome Statute: “The Trial 
Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is 
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”64  
ICTY Statute Article 20(1) and the Rome Statute Article 
64(2) establish the trial chamber as the authority in determining what 
constitutes a fair trial and whether parties are in compliance with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  This mandate grants trial 
chambers a huge amount of discretionary power.  These provisions 
also require that a trial chamber ensure fairness, expeditiousness, 
respect for the rights of the accused, and regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses.  In essence, a trial chamber has the difficult 
task of balancing the competing interests of parties or participants.  
2. Authority over matters of protection 
With regard to the protection of victims and witnesses, both 
the ICTY and the ICC grant the trial chambers ultimate authority 
over these decisions.  The following two sections will explain the 
different statutory bases for the authority of the ICC and ICTY trial 
chambers. 
i) ICC 
At the ICC, discretionary authority over the protection of 
victims and witnesses is enshrined in the Rome Statute and the Rules 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
63 Updated Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, art. 20(1), Sept. 2009 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].  
64 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(2). 
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of Procedure and Evidence.  Article 64 of the Rome Statute states 
that: “The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the 
accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.”65  Thus, according to the Rome Statute, the Trial 
Chamber has both the privilege and the burden to maintain the 
fairness and expeditiousness of the trial.  Additionally, the Trial 
Chamber has responsibility for the welfare of the accused, the 
witnesses, and the victims, as its decisions have an impact on these 
parties. 
Rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC 
also enables the Trial Chamber to “order measures to protect a 
victim, a witness or another person at risk on account of testimony 
given by a witness . . . . ”66  Interestingly, Rule 84 enables the Trial 
Chamber to order disclosures,67 and Rule 81 foresees that such 
disclosures may be the cause of enhanced risk to a participant in the 
proceedings, as it states: “When the disclosure of such information 
may create a risk to the safety of the witness, the Court shall take 
measures to inform the witness in advance.”68  The Rome Statute, 
therefore, provides for situations when disclosures that negatively 
affect a witness’s safety become necessary.   
The Trial Chamber is further tasked with remedying the 
detrimental impact on victim and witness safety as it sees fit.  Part 4 
of Rule 81 states: “The Chamber dealing with the matter shall, on its 
own motion or at the request of the Prosecutor, the accused or any 
State, take the necessary steps to . . . protect the safety of witnesses 
and victims and members of their families.”69  Because it is the 
entity tasked with making decisions concerning protection, the 
security of witnesses, victims, and others at risk due to testimony is 
the Trial Chamber’s responsibility.  If the Trial Chamber should 
make poor decisions or orders in this regard, the parties may bring 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
65 Id. 
66 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 87, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part. II-A) (Sept. 9, 
2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence]. 
67 Id. r. 84 (“The Trial Chamber shall…make any necessary orders for the 
disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed and for the 
production of additional evidence. To avoid delay and to ensure that the trial 
commences on the set date, any such orders shall include strict time limits which 
shall be kept under review by the Trial Chamber.”). 
68 Id. r. 81(3). 
69 Id. r. 81(4). 
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the issue up to the appeals chamber to remedy the damage done, 
either during proceedings, in the form of interlocutory appeals, or 
after a decision is rendered.  Interlocutory appeals, however, are 
subject to certain conditions, which are explained in detail in section 
III(d). 
the Chamber will 
consult the VWU regarding protective measures: 
sk 
ony given by a witness . . . . 71 
[emphasis added]. 
ther individuals who are at 
risk on account of witness testimony.72   
Although the Trial Chamber has the discretion to decide 
matters of witness protection on its own, other parties, participants, 
and organs of the Court may make suggestions, provide advice, and 
appeal the Trial Chamber’s decisions.70  The Victims and Witnesses 
Unit (VWU) participates in precisely this manner.  Specifically, the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence foresee that 
Upon the motion of the Prosecutor or the defence or 
upon the request of a witness or a victim or his or her 
legal representative, if any, or on its own motion, and 
after having consulted with the Victims and Witnesses 
Unit, as appropriate, a Chamber may order measures 
to protect a victim, a witness or another person at ri
on account of testim
Article 43(6) of the Rome Statute also specifically recognizes the 
intertwined role of the prosecution in matters of witness protection; 
it states that the VWU, in consultation with the prosecution, will 
provide protective measures, security arrangements, and other types 
of support for victims, witnesses, and o
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
70 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68(4) (“The Victims and Witnesses Unit 
may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate protective measures, 
security arrangements, counseling and assistance….”); see also ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 81(4) (“The Chamber dealing with the 
matter shall, on its own motion or at the request of the Prosecutor, the accused or 
ictims 
 risk on account of testimony given by such 
any State, take the necessary steps to…protect the safety of witnesses and v
and members of their families…”). 
71 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 87(1). 
72 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 43(6): “The Registrar shall set up a Victims and 
Witnesses Unit within the Registry. This Unit shall provide, in consultation with 
the Office of the Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements, 
counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear 
before the Court, and others who are at
?
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Further, the VWU is the expert entity that advises the Court 
on the above-referenced protective and supportive measures73 and 
recommends the adoption of particular protective measures.74  The 
VWU’s mandate requires that it be an impartial service provider,75 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence further provide for the 
VWU to employ experts in witness protection and security.76  Given 
its neutrality and expertise, the VWU is the appropriate entity to 
assess an individual’s risk in the event any questions or debate arise. 
ii) ICTY 
Like the ICC, trial chambers at the ICTY have discretionary 
authority over the protection of individuals involved with the court.  
Rule 69(A) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that: 
“In exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor may apply to a Judge 
or Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity of a 
victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person 
is brought under the protection of the Tribunal.”77  A failure to 
comply with disclosure obligations results in sanctions.78 
Rule 75 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence grants the 
Trial Chamber the right to order protective measures for victims and 
witnesses on its own initiative or at the request of a party or the 
individual concerned.79  Furthermore, the ICTY’s Rule 75 details the 
measures possible for the protection of victims and witnesses while 
emphasizing the Trial Chamber’s exclusive control over such 
measures.80  However, Rule 69(B) provides that in determining 
protective measures, the Trial Chamber “may consult the Victims 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including trauma 
 of sexual violence.”  
 Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 17(2)(a)(ii). 
/32/Rev. 44 
[hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence]. 
rovided that the measures are consistent with the rights of the 
. 
related to crimes
73 Id. art. 68(4). 
74 ICC Rules of
75 Id. r. 18(b). 
76 Id. r. 19(a). 
77 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 69(A), U.N. Doc. IT
(Dec. 10, 2009) 
78 Id. r. 68 bis.  
79 Id. r. 75(A) (“A Judge or a Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of 
either party, or of the victim or witness concerned, or of the Victims and Witnesses 
Section, order appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of victims and 
witnesses, p
accused.”). 
80 Id. r. 75(B–K)
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and Witnesses Section” [emphasis added].81  Additionally, Rule 34 
specifically notes that the Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) has 
the ability to recommend particular protective measures to the Trial 
Chamber on behalf of victims and witnesses.82  Thus, the ICTY 
Rules are clear that there is no requirement to consult with the VWS.  
The VWS, therefore, plays an advisory role in informing the Trial 
Chamb
rties, participants, and VWU/VWS 
regarding matters of protection.  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
er’s orders concerning victim and witness protection.   
Noteworthy is the fact that neither the ICTY nor the ICC 
statutes or rules provide for any other entity to make final 
determinations concerning the fairness of the proceedings or the 
measures appropriate for protecting participants in the proceedings.  
The Trial Chamber, therefore, has the discretionary authority to 
make any and all decisions in these areas, subject only to the check 
of the Appeals Chamber.83 The Trial Chamber, however, may 
always seek opinions from the pa
D. The Failed Applications for Interlocutory Appeals  
According to ICC Rule 155(1), parties or participants may 
lodge an interlocutory appeal at any point during the proceedings, 
subject to the approval of an application submitted to the trial 
chamber.84  In order to grant leave to appeal, however, the Trial 
Chamber must find that the issue meets several criteria, one of which 
is that the issue affects the fairness and expediency of the 
?
n error 
s of being notified of that decision, 
81 Id. r. 69(B).  
82 Id. r. 34(A)(i). 
83 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 82(1)(d) (“Either party may appeal . . . a 
decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and 
expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, 
in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the 
Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings.”); see also ICTY 
Statute, supra note 63, art. 25 (“(1) The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from 
persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following 
grounds: (a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or (b) a
of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. (2) The Appeals Chamber 
may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers.”). 
84 See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r.155(1) (“When a 
party wishes to appeal a decision under article 82, paragraph 1(d), or article 82, 
paragraph 2, that party shall, within five day
make a written application to the Chamber that gave the decision, setting out the 
reasons for the request for leave to appeal.”). 
?
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proceedings or the outcome of the trial.85  Only if the application for 
leave to appeal is granted will the appeals chamber hear the issue.86  
At the ICTY, an interlocutory appeal is permitted by Rule 73(B), the 
requirements of which are identical to those of the ICC Rule 
155(1).87  Like the ICC Trial Chambers, the ICTY Trial Chambers 
must ap
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prove applications for interlocutory appeals.88   
The Lubanga Trial Chamber assessed an application for an 
interlocutory appeal on June 4, 2010, when the prosecution applied 
for leave to appeal the disclosure order regarding Intermediary 143.89  
Among other arguments, the prosecution contended that the fairness 
of the trial would be compromised because disclosure would 
“critically impact[] . . . the Prosecution’s ability to fulfill its duties 
with regard to protection.”90  Concerning the effect on the outcome 
of the trial, the prosecution argued that “because the Decision 
negates the usefulness of Intermediary 143, and because it will have 
consequences on the recruitment of other intermediaries, this will 
impair the prosecution’s ability to call relevant evidence, and as a 
result it will have a direct impact on the outcome of the trial.”91  The 
Trial Chamber rejected the prosecution’s arguments and held that the 
order of disclosure neither impacted the fairness or expediency of the 
?
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, 
ve to Appeal, ¶¶ 9–14 (July 13, 
tly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or 
tcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, an 
ution Request for leave to Appeal the Decision on 
ies, ¶¶ 2, 7, 35 (June 2, 2010).  
85 See 
Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s 3 March 2006 Decision Denying Lea
2006). 
86 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 155(1); ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 77, r. 73(B). 
87 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 77, at r. 73(B) (“Decisions 
on all motions are without interlocutory appeal save with certification by the Trial 
Chamber, which may grant such certification if the decision involves an issue that 
would significan
the ou
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the 
proceedings.”). 
88 Id. 
89 See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.  ICC-01/04-01/06-
2463, Decision on the Prosec
Intermediar
90 Id. ¶ 11, quoting Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent 
Request, supra note 58, ¶ 33. 
91 Id. ¶ 20. 
?




possibly delay the trial pending the issue’s resolution.  Given the 
pressure on international tribunals to be efficient and also to bolster 
the public’s perception of their credibility and legitimacy,95 one 
??????????????????????????????????????????
ings nor affected the outcome of the trial.92  Thus, the 
prosecution was not able to argue its position regarding Intermediary 
143 at the appeals level. 
Similarly, the prosecution in Haradinaj applied for leave to 
appeal the Trial Chamber’s decisions that denied extensions of time 
to obtain the testimony of a key witness.93  The Trial Chamber also 
rejected this application on the grounds that it did not meet the 
criteria for an interlocutory appeal.  The Trial Chamber found that 
the denial of time extensions was not outcome-determinative 
because the prosecution had failed to show that the key witness, 
Shefqet Kabashi, was likely to testify if the extension
.94  Having been silenced by the Trial Chamber, the 
prosecution never had the chance to present its arguments regarding 
the extensions and this witness before the Appeals Chamber. 
Both trial chambers determined that the respective issues in 
Lubanga and Haradinaj would not affect the outcome of the trials; 
the opposite came true, however.  In Lubanga, the unsettled issue of 
the disclosure of Intermediary 143 resulted in actions by both the 
prosecution and the Trial Chamber that threatened to terminate the 
proceedings.  In Haradinaj, the Appeals Chamber found that the 
absence of witness testimony could have affected the outcome of the 
case.  These instances indicate that the merits of appeal applications 
are difficult for a trial chamber to accurately assess.  This task 
presents a conflict of interest for the trial chamber because the trial 
chamber must assess its own decisions.  To expect a trial chamber to 
do so impartially is perhaps unrealistic.  In reviewing applications to 
appeal, a trial chamber is forced to decide between two options.  The 
first is to justify the trial chamber’s own actions by categorizing the 
issues presented as non-outcome determinative and not having a 
great impact on the fairness or expediency of trial. The second 
alternative is for the trial chamber to admit a potential error and 
????????????????? ?
92 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-
04-84-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Certification to Appeal the 
Trial Chamber’s Decision Concerning Shefqet Kabashi, ¶ 4 (Dec. 5, 2007). 
93 Id. ¶ 1. 
94 Id. ¶ 3. 
95 International tribunals face a variety of criticisms, including that they do not 
have a legitimate legal basis, are political tools for conducting witch hunts, and 
?
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could imagine that trial chamber judges may confront questions of 
their authority with a variety of motivations, including, among 
others, the desire to appear consistent, principled, and decisive.  
Although these are noble goals, they may result in judges being 
biased in favor of their own decisions. 
A policy that could prevent similar problems in the future for 
both the ICC and the ICTY is to lower the standard for interlocutory 
appeals.  Rather than requiring that an issue be outcome-
determinative or greatly impacting upon the fairness or expediency 
of the proceedings, the issue could be characterized as one that may 
be outcome-determinative or would affect the fairness and 
expediency of a trial to a considerable degree.  If trial chambers 
used this standard, appeals chambers would be more likely to assess 
problematic issues at an earlier stage, as more applications for appeal 
would likely be successful.96  There is a great advantage to an 
appeals chamber assessing the issues for which the parties seek an 
appeal, as opposed to the trial chamber silencing them by rejecting 
appeals applications.  An appeals chamber is separated from the day-
to-day proceedings of the trial and, therefore, may be less susceptible 
to the above-noted biases and pressures that a trial chamber faces.  
An appeals chamber, not the trial chamber, is the most appropriate 
decision-maker for particularly sensitive issues like the ones 
addressed in this article.   
If the interlocutory appeal application had been granted, the 
Lubanga prosecution would have been able to fully plead its case 
regarding Intermediary 143.  In the prosecution’s later appeal of the 
Trial Chamber’s decision to stay the proceedings, it argued that what 
the Trial Chamber characterized as “non-compliance” was simply a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
have neo-colonialist motives. See, e.g., Stephen Asiimwe, ICC is another colonial 
ICC a “new jacket for 
Trial Chamber is great.  
ocuses on the Trial Chamber’s orders or conduct.  
hangover, NewVision Website, Jun. 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/459/758825 (calling the 
colonial hangover”); John Perazzo, International Kangaroo Court, 
Frontpagemag.com, July 30, 2003, available at http://archive.frontpagem 
ag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=17001 (arguing that the ICC would “likely be 
used as a political and public relations battering ram…”). 
96 When a Trial Chamber’s own decision is contested by way of an interlocutory 
appeal application, the danger for bias on the part of the 
Another possible remedy for this apparent conflict of interest is to allow the 
Appeals Chamber, rather than the Trial Chamber, to assess applications for 
interlocutory appeals.  This method is sensible, at the very least, when the issue of 
appeal f
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disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s disclosure orders.97   Further, 
the prosecution argued that it had been denied the proper opportunity 
to object.98  Had the prosecution settled the issue with the Appeals 
Chamber, it would not have been able to justify its non-compliance 
with the Trial Chamber’s orders.  Without such justification for non-
compliance, the prosecution would, presumably, not have disobeyed 
the Trial Chamber’s orders, and the proceedings would not have 
been stayed.  Similarly, assuming that the Appeals Chamber would 
have reached the same decision in Haradinaj during the trial as it did 
after the trial concluded, much time could have been saved, as a re-
trial wo
 Lubanga and Haradinaj in comparison to what 
actually unfolded. 
IV. PART ERS’ DISCRETION  
A. Analysis of the Protection Issues 
uld not likely have become necessary.   
The Trial Chambers’ denial of the interlocutory appeals was 
ostensibly linked to their desire to move forward with the 
proceedings without unnecessary detours.  Ironically, granting the 
interlocutory appeals in these instances could have shortened the 
proceedings in both
TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRIAL CHAMB
1. Lubanga 
Following the rejection of its application for leave to appeal 
the disclosure order, the Lubanga prosecution lodged a series of 
requests for time extensions concerning disclosure.   The Trial 
Chamber refused to grant any extensions, as it viewed the issue as 








Red, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber 
decision of 8 July 2010 to stay the proceedings for abuse of process (July 30, 
2010). 
98 Id.  
99 Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶¶ 9-13.   
100 Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note 
58, ¶ 10 (“In our judgment the proposal outlined by the Chamber, which as I have 
said we understood to be acceptable to the Defence, namely that disclosure should 
be limited to those in Court today and the Defence resource person with no 
investigative steps being taken until a further order was issued by the Chamber, 
does not materially undermine the position of 143, or in any way enhance any risk 
that may exist for him . . . In those circumstances we do not consider that there
?
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order to disclose had been significantly altered to require disclosure 
before protective measures could be put in place, albeit to a limited 
group of people for limited purposes.   Instead, the Trial Chamber 
ordered immediate disclosure to the defense team, including a 
defense resource person, and required the disclosure to be limited to 
the questioning of a def
101




ative purposes.102   
The prosecution objected to the limited disclosure for several 
reasons.  First, the prosecution alleged that the defense resource 
person was not trustworthy.103  Second, the prosecution argued that 
the intermediary’s safety would be at risk if his identity was 
disclosed prior to the implementation of the protective measures,104 a 
point for which the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) 
 contemporaneous input and only later disagreed.105   
Without a full analysis of the serious issues concerning 
Intermediary 143 and the potential repercussions of disclosure, the 
Trial Chamber pushed the proceedings forward by ordering a limited 
disclosure twice on July 7, 2010.106  The Chamber justified this 
course of action for several reasons.  First, the Chamber implied that 
since protective measures had been offered, though rejected, by the 
Intermediary, the Court had fulfilled its obligation to protect the 
Intermediary.107  Second, the Chamber dismissed the prosecution’s 
concern that one of the members of the defense team was of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
any potential increased risk to 143 and, [ . . . ] we do not consider it necessary to 
suspend that order pending any application that may be made by the Prosecution 
for leave to appeal. It would, in our view, only be necessary to suspend that order 
 was a risk that it would enhance or increase the security risk for 143.”). 
ome defence witnesses made allegations that he 
WU, at 7 ¶ 




102 Id. ¶ 19. 
103 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2544-
Red, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s 
decision of 8 July 2010 to Stay the Proceedings for Abuse of Process, ¶ 3 (July 30, 
2010) (“The resource person was allegedly one of the top members of Lubanga’s 
militia. He is in DRC and s
attempted to taint evidence.”). 
104 Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2515, Prosecution's Urgent Request 
for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or 
Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with V
2 (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Lubanga Prosecution’s Urgent Request].  
105 Lubanga Re
58, ¶¶ 14, 17.  
106 Id. ¶
107 Id.  
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questio
bout risk, the Trial Chamber declined to 





 to appeal.  It would, in our view, only be 
necessary to suspend that order if there were a risk 
ing.  Rather, the 
Trial C
nable integrity because “no conclusion adverse to that 
individual [] has been drawn by anyone in a responsible position in 
this Court.”108   
Third, even though the Trial Chamber had changed the 
timing of the disclosure (requiring that it occur prior to the 
implementation of protective measures), the Trial Chamber opined 
that the limited nature of the disclosure ensured that the security risk 
of the Intermediary would not increase.109  In making this 
unwarranted assumption a
ted the possibility for the prosecution to appeal the de
ted the following:  
We do not consider it necessary to suspend th[e] or
[to disclose the identity of Intermediary 143] pendin
any application that may be made by the Prosecution 
for leave
that it would enhance or increase the security risk for 
143.110  
The Chamber’s orders for a limited disclosure of Intermediary 143’s 
identity were, in its own opinion, sufficient to ensure the safety of 
the Intermediary.  This determination was, however, not based upon 
any evidence or consultations with the VWU regarding the 
alterations to the disclosure’s parameters and tim
hamber independently made the determination about what 
was necessary for Intermediary 143’s protection.  Technically, the 
Trial Chamber possesses the discretion to do so.111 
The Trial Chamber did not contact the VWU regarding an 
updated security assessment for Intermediary 143 until July 8, 2010.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
108 Id.  
109 Lubanga Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note 
58, ¶ 12 (“[T]he limited disclosure that we have ordered, in our judgment, has the 
result of ensuring that there is no deterioration in the security position of that 
individual.”), quoting the Trial Chamber’s Second Ruling, delivered on July 7, 
2010. 
110 Id. ¶ 10, quoting Transcript of Hearing on 7 July 2010, at p. 9, line 20, to p. 13, 
line 25, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
2517-Red, ¶ 13 (July 7, 2010). 
111 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(2). 
?
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The Chamber’s consultation of the VWU was prompted by the 
prosecution’s submission: “Prosecution’s Urgent Request for 
Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 
143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further 
Consultations with the VWU.”  In this submission, the prosecution 
claimed
of [the prosecution’s] 
submis
disclosure on a person 
granted
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 it would “consult with the VWU as to whether the security 
situation allows for disclosure now” and needed to “know whether 
there is any need to implement urgent interim measures prior to 
disclosure.”112    
When the Trial Chamber subsequently contacted the VWU, 
the VWU stated that it had understood the Trial Chamber’s order to 
include a requirement to notify Intermediary 143 of the disclosure 
order and to discuss interim measures.113  The VWU also informed 
the Trial Chamber that the limited disclosure of Intermediary 143’s 
identity would not present a security risk, directly contradicting the 
assertions of the prosecution in its earlier submission.114  In response 
to this incongruity, the Trial Chamber stated: “there is reason to 
doubt the accuracy and reliability 
sion.”115  The Trial Chamber ignored the prosecution’s pleas 
to revisit the security issue and, following the prosecution’s non-
compliance with the two orders of disclosure on July 7, 2010, the 
Trial Chamber stayed the proceedings.116  
The timing of the Trial Chamber’s consultation of the VWU 
was backwards, as it was only after the prosecution refused to 
comply with the limited disclosure orders that the Trial Chamber 
explored whether such orders would increase the risk to Intermediary 
143, given his unprotected status.  Thus, the VWU was consulted 
amidst the power struggle between the Trial Chamber and the 
prosecution.  At best, the VWU was able to make an on-the-spot 
determination of the effect of a limited 
 protective measures that had not yet been implemented.  At 
worst, the VWU did not have the time to thoroughly investigate the 
concerns of the prosecution and Intermediary 143 prior to its 
endorsement of the Trial Chamber’s orders. 
?
112 Lubanga Prosecution's Urgent Request, supra note 104, quoted in Lubanga 
Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request, supra note 58, ¶ 14. 
113 Id. ¶ 13. 
114 Id. ¶ 17. 
115 Id. ¶ 14. 
116 Id. ¶ 31. 
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In either event, the VWU should have been consulted prior to 
ordering disclosure if there was a disagreement concerning an 
individual’s security.  Not doing so reflected a lack of concern for 
the protection of those involved with the court.  Without providing 
assurances to witnesses that their safety is of utmost importance, the 
legitimacy and feasibility of the proceedings are jeopardized.  The 
Trial Chamber, however, had a different priority; it stated that “given 
the attitude now demonstrated by 143, there is an appreciable risk 
that implementation will be delayed significantly,” and it refused to 
accommodate the witnes ather than focusing on the 
needs of Interm
s’s situation.117  R
ediary 143, the Trial Chamber was preoccupied with 
preventing delays of the trial.   
2. Haradinaj 
By rejecting the prosecution’s requests for extensions and its 
application for leave to appeal, the Trial Chamber in Haradinaj 
closed the prosecution’s case and proceeded with the defense’s 
case.   The prosecution, the118 refore, was unable to obtain the 
testimo
specifically 
identified two errors of the Trial Chamber.  First, the Trial Chamber 
refused the prosecution’s requests to take “reasonable measures” to 
???????????????????????????????????????
ny of two key witnesses, which, it claimed, resulted in the 
acquittals of the defendants.119  In its appeal of these acquittals, the 
prosecution argued that it had been deprived of a fair trial, a right 
guaranteed by Article 20(1).120   
Article 20(1) states: “The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a 
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in 
accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full 
respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection 
of victims and witnesses.”121  The prosecution argued that, according 
to 20(1), a chamber must ensure that neither party has a disadvantage 
in presenting its case and that the Trial Chamber failed in its duty to 
maintain a fair trial.122  The prosecution’s appeal 
???????????????????? ?
j, Case No. 
-A A540-A483, Prosecution Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 4 
 [hereinafter Haradinaj et al. Prosecution Appeal Brief]. 
atute, supra note 63. 
inaj et al. Prosecution Appeal Brief, supra note 118, ¶¶ 6–7. 
117 Id. ¶ 12. 
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obtain the testimony of the witnesses.123  Second, the Trial Chamber
s to elicit this evid
 
did not exercise its own power ence.124 
B. How the Tri f International Criminal al Chambers Advanced Goals o
Trials 
1. General remarks 
“Swift justice is more certain justice,” stated Alex Whiting in 
his analysis of expediency in international criminal trials.   “If 
present and future leaders and commanders see that war criminals 
are brought to justice quickly (and of course effectively), they will 
be more likely to conform their behavior 
125
to the laws of war and to 
adopt p
 is respected.129  Whiting also cites the possibility 
that the international community, with its short attention span, will 
move on to other cr cooperation if proceedings 
take too long.130
olicies and promote training to ensure that these rules are 
followed.”126  Thus, preventing excessive or unnecessary delays is 
important in order to promote deterrence. 
Efficient management of the proceedings is also important in 
terms of fairness to both the accused and the victims.  For victims, 
speedy justice can reduce disillusionment and promote cooperation 
with the court.127  Also, fast proceedings help in terms of the 
preservation of evidence.128  When trials are completed quickly, the 
accused’s right to an expeditious trial, enshrined in the Rome Statute 
and ICTY Statute,
ises and reduce their 
   
2. Lubanga 
In Lubanga, the prosecution requested a stay of the 
proceedings in order to consult with the VWU and to resolve the 
protection issues concerning Intermediary 143 before continuing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
123 Id. ¶ 5. 
124 Id.   
125 Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be 
Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 330 (2009). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 333. 
128 Id. at 332-33. 
129 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(2); ICTY Statute, supra note 63, art. 
20(1). 
130 See Whiting, supra note 125, at 333–34. 
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with the trial.  By refusing this request and insisting upon the limited 
disclosure, as the Trial Chamber did, the Court stood to gain several 
things.  First, it prevented the inevitable delay that would result if 
Intermediary 143 were permitted to negotiate a satisfactory 
protection agreement, a process which could be extended and 
protracted.  Additionally, if the Court catered to Intermediary 143’s 
dissatisfaction with the protection package already offered by the 
VWU, the Court would be acknowledging that such packages are 
negotiable.  By empowering the intermediary to reject the VWU’s 
protection plan, the Court may give Intermediary 143 the impression 
of being in an advantaged bargaining position.  Such a precedent 
could be dangerous and unmanageable for the VWU, which has 
financi
 check on 
witnesses involved in protection negotiations with the VWU, the 
worst case scenario s of both time and money 
for the Cour
al and practical constraints that limit its operations.  A witness 
could, hypothetically, hold out and refuse to testify in an attempt to 
secure a larger financial package or a particular place for relocation, 
which could present significant or even unaffordable costs for the 
Registry.131 
If witnesses are given this opportunity to manipulate the 
system by leveraging their bargaining position, the VWU would be 
in a very weak position to overcome the demands of this individual 
in order to allow the trial to go on.  Therefore, if there is no
 would be costly in term
t.  The Trial Chamber in Lubanga did not allow for this 
type of manipulation to occur, possibly sparing the Court from being 
put in this disadvantaged position.  
3. Haradinaj 
In Haradinaj, the main problem in waiting for witnesses’ 
testimony was that there was no assurance that the witnesses would 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
131 Protective measures can include both relocation to a different geographical area 
and a stipend from the Registry to enable resettlement.  See ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 66, r. 16(4) (providing for “[a]greements on 
relocation and provision of support services on the territory of a State of 
traumatized or threatened victims, witnesses and others who are at risk on account 
of testimony given by such witnesses . . . .”); see also r.17(2)(a)(i) (“The Victims 
and Witnesses Unit shall, inter alia, perform the following functions, in 
accordance with the Statute and the Rules, and in consultation with the Chamber, 
the Prosecutor and the defense, as appropriate: (i) Providing them with adequate 
protective and security measures and formulating long- and short-term plans for 
their protection.”). 
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ever testify; so extensions for them could be futile.  In fact, the 
prosecution had already tried and failed to obtain these two 
witnesses’ testimonies on multiple occasions.   One witness, 
Shefqet Kabashi, refused to answer questions on two different 
occasions, in spite of the fact that the Trial Chamber had already 
granted three time extensions,  offered the ability to testify via 
video-conference link,  and issued an Order in Lieu of Indictment 
for Contempt against the witness.   Notwithstanding these efforts to 
facilitate or compel testimony, the witness would not comply.  Thus, 
the Trial Chamber asserted that, although several witnesses who 
were expected to give evidence were never heard, it had “made use 





te the reception of 
evidenc
nce of evidence to the 
contrar
Kabashi’s attitude, which gave cause to believe that he genuinely 
intended to testify, then the Chamber would entertain a further 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
e without stepping beyond its role as an impartial arbiter of 
facts” in its attempt to acquire this evidence.136   
In its rejection of the prosecution’s request for an extension 
in order to make further attempts to obtain the testimony of Kabashi, 
the Trial Chamber emphasized that the prosecution never argued that 
the testimony of Kabashi would be any more likely to materialize if 
the prosecution was given more time.137  Procedurally, the Trial 
Chamber had taken significant steps to compel testimony, and these 
failed efforts, in combination with the abse
y, were a sufficient indication that the witness never intended 
to testify, according to the Trial Chamber.138 
In recognition of this witness’s asserted intentions, the Trial 
Chamber stated that: “if there were to be a ‘dramatic change’ in 
?
132 The Prosecutor v. Shefqet Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Request for Certification to Appeal the Trial Chamber’s Decision 
concerning Shefqet Kabashi, (Dec. 5, 2007). 
133 The Prosecutor v. Shefqet Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Appeals Chamber 
Decision, ¶ 21 (July 19, 2010). 
134 See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 77, r. 81 bis and r. 
71(D) (Testifying via video-conference allows a witness to testify from a place 
other than the courtroom at the seat of the Court.). 
135 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-
04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 27 (Apr. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Haradinaj et al. Judgment]. 
136 Id. ¶ 28.  
137 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-
04-84-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Certification to Appeal the 
Trial Chamber’s Decision Concerning Shefqet Kabashi, ¶ 25 (Dec. 5, 2007). 
138 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 25. 
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application to receive his testimony.”139  The defense argued that 
“[t]he mere possibility that [Kabashi] might change his mind at some 
later stage if he received further legal advice did not warrant a 
further adjournment of the Prosecution case.”140  As there was no 
dramatic change in Kabashi’s attitude, the trial proceeded, and 
concluded, without his testimony.  If Kabashi and the other witness 
truly never intended to testify, then the Trial Chamber saved itself 
countless weeks of pointless waiting.   
4. Concluding remarks 
Efficiency in international criminal trials is clearly a 
legitimate goal.  Courts’ prioritization of efficiency when faced with 
situations that could cause delays of an unknown duration is, 
therefore, not surprising.  The next section will argue, however, that 
certain objectives, namely the protection of those involved in court 
proceedings, should trump the goal of maximal trial efficiency even 
if the length of delays is uncertain. 
C. How the Trial Chambers Undermined Goals of International Criminal 
Trials 
1. General remarks 
In a letter to the President of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Kofi Annan, then the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, wrote the following:  
The overriding interest [of the ICC] must be that of 
the victims, [sic] and of the international community 
as a whole.  The court must be an instrument of 
justice, not expedience.  It must be able to protect the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
139 Id., quoting Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj, 
Case No. IT-04-84-A, Respondent’s Brief on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj 
(confidential), ¶ 39 (Aug. 25, 2008). 
140 Id., quoting Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahima, 
Case No. IT-04-84-A, Respondent’s Brief on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj 
(confidential), ¶ 46 (Aug. 25, 2008). 
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weak against the strong.  It must demonstrate that an 
international conscience is a reality.141 
There are several problems with a court that is viewed as an 
‘instrument of expedience.’  Judges may be perceived to be 
inattentive to witnesses’ needs, and the court may deter future 
witnesses from cooperation.  A trial that proceeds at an unforgiving 
pace might also appear to be biased and may, as a result, lose respect 
and credibility.  A trial that moves too rapidly might also prevent the 
utilization of witnesses who may not be willing to testify until 
significantly after the alleged crimes were committed.142  Whiting 
argues that “time can allow for witnesses to gain perspective on 
events in which they participated and to come forward to provide 
testimony and evidence.  The passage of time, then, can allow for a 
more complete and truer accounting of events to emerge.”143  
Whiting also states that lengthy trials are often necessary because of 
their very nature144 and that delays can be vital to effective 
prosecutions.145  Whiting’s view is that although the public has 
“shown signs of impatience and an increased preference for shorter, 
quicker, and narrower cases . . . cases will require a sustained and 
long-term commitment from the international community.”146  
The ICC and ICTY Trial Chambers made their priority of 
expediency clear by rejecting the prosecution’s requests pertaining to 
the protection of individuals involved with the court and by denying 
their applications for interlocutory appeals.  While expedient 
proceedings are often ideal, promoting expediency often involves the 
balancing of other priorities, or, as alleged by the prosecution in both 
Lubanga and Haradinaj, the sacrifice of the fairness of the trials.  
Both prosecution teams claimed that the consequences outweighed 
the benefits when it came to expediting the proceedings.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
141 Letter from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the 
President of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (July 7, 1998). 
142 See Whiting, supra note 125, at 354–56 (describing the examples of Milan 
Babic and Göran Stoparic, whose truthful and complete testimony took years to 
acquire in ICTY proceedings). 
143 Id. at 358. 
144 Id. at 327. 
145 Id. at 363. 
146 Id. at 364. 
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2. Lubanga 
The Lubanga prosecution made several arguments in its 
appeal of the Trial Chamber’s stay of the proceedings.147  The first 
argument was that the prosecution’s behavior was not non-compliant 
with the Trial Chamber’s orders.148  The second argument was that 
the prosecution shares the responsibility for the protection of 
witnesses with the other organs of the Court, and that the Chamber 
erred in ruling unilaterally on issues affecting the safety of 
Intermediary 143.149  In sum, the prosecution stated that the 
Chamber’s decision reflected a “deep misunderstanding of the legal 
positions of the Prosecution, its protection duties under the Statute 
and its right to a reasonable opportunity and time to present its 
legitimate concerns to the Chamber.”150   
As to the timing of the prosecution’s requests for delays and 
reconsideration of the protection issues, the prosecution claimed that 
its “insistence to present its views after [the Trial Chamber’s orders] 
was wrongly considered to be defiance of the Court’s authority.”151  
The prosecution claimed that it was never afforded the opportunity 
to voice its concerns about the safety and security risks that the 
disclosure of Intermediary 143’s identity would present.152 
The prosecution emphasized the unfairness of the Trial 
Chamber’s “haste” in issuing a “unilateral decision” on a protection 
matter, for which the prosecution, the VWU, and the Trial Chamber 
share responsibility.153  The prosecution stated that it has the right to 
object to the Trial Chamber’s orders, to seek appellate review of 
such orders, and to suggest alternatives, such as withdrawing 
evidence, stipulating to particular facts, or amending charges, should 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
147 The third argument by the prosecution was that the stay of the proceedings was 
a disproportionate response to non-compliance, should the prosecution’s actions be 
characterized as such.  This article will not address the particulars of the third 
argument. 
148 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecution’s Document in Support 
of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s decision of 8 July 2010 to stay the 
proceedings for abuse of process, ICC-01/04-01/06-2544-Red, ¶¶ 51–53 (July 30, 
2010). 
149 Id. ¶¶ 65–69. 
150 Id. ¶ 2. 
151 Id. ¶ 4. 
152 Id. ¶ 3. 
153 Id. ¶ 48. 
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its objections fail.154  The prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber 
amended its order of disclosure without allowing the prosecution to 
present updated information, including confidential material of 
which the Trial Chamber may not have been aware.155  The 
prosecution contended that the Trial Chamber “spontaneously and 
unilaterally” determined that the amended order posed no increased 
risk without consulting the entities with relevant and material 
information156 when the Chamber had a duty to verify that its 
assumptions about the safety of Intermediary 143, following a 
limited disclosure, were correct.157  Thus, the prosecution claimed 
that the Trial Chamber was unreasonably dismissive, resulting in 
injustice.158 
The prosecution cited to the Rome Statute, as well as an 
Appeals Chamber decision, as justification for its independent 
authority to protect witnesses and to support its allegation that the 
Trial Chamber “erred by concluding that it has a monopoly of 
protective functions.”159  The prosecution specifically identified the 
Rome Statute Articles 68(1), 54(1)(b) and 54(3)(f) as explicitly 
involving the prosecution in matters pertaining to witnesses.160  
Additionally, the prosecution quoted the Appeals Chamber in 
describing the team effort of protecting those at risk: “Consultation, 
cooperation and advice are all part of ensuring that individuals are 
not put at risk . . . .”161  Thus, the prosecution’s argument centered 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
154 Id. ¶ 17(iii). 
155 Id. ¶ 49.  
156 Id. ¶ 49. 
157 Id. ¶ 53. 
158 Id. ¶¶ 49, 57. 
159 Id. ¶ 66. 
160 Id. ¶ 62. “Article 68(1) states that ‘[t]he Prosecutor shall take such measures 
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of [ . . . ] crimes.’ ‘A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.’ The word ‘shall’ in Article 68(1), given its ordinary meaning and the 
context in which it is used, underlines that this is a mandatory duty upon the 
Prosecutor to take appropriate measures to protect persons interacting with it. 
Article 68(1) also specifies that the Prosecution’s duty of protection applies 
‘particularly during the investigation and prosecution of [ . . . ] crimes.’ Hence, 
there is no doubt that the Prosecution duty to protect persons equally applies 
during trial.”  
161 Id. ¶ 60. 
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upon the notion that the Trial Chamber does not have exclusive and 
unchecked authority over protection matters. 
The prosecution also made several practical points.  First, it 
stated that the risks presented by the immediate disclosure were not 
outweighed by its benefits because the disclosure would not 
necessarily expedite the proceedings.  Given the fact that the 
disclosure prohibited the use of Intermediary 143’s identity for 
investigative purposes, the prosecution claimed that it was likely that 
143 would be recalled to testify once the prohibition was lifted.162  
Fully implementing protective measures after all barriers were lifted 
for the defense would, presumably, be more efficient because it 
would allow all of the questioning to occur at once and would 
prevent redundant testimony.  
Second, the prosecution argued that the short-term delay 
resulting from the time required to implement the protective 
measures was relatively minor: 
 [T]he sole issue before the Trial Chamber here was 
the potential for a week or two delay in the case, 
which in the context of a trial that has already lasted 
for 18 months is not significant. Moreover, the harm 
to the defence from non-disclosure—the short-term 
delay of trial—was insignificant. Indeed, it would 
have been abusive to jeopardize a person at risk in 
order to avoid a brief delay.163 
Thus, the prosecution believed that the protection of an individual 
outweighed the need for expediency in the trial.164  The Lubanga 
prosecution’s concerns, however, fell on deaf ears. 
3. Haradinaj 
In Haradinaj, the prosecution appealed the Trial Chamber’s 
acquittal of the three accused.  The prosecution argued that the Trial 
Chamber violated the statutory right to a fair trial by refusing the 
prosecution’s requests for additional time to obtain the testimony of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
162 Id. ¶ 39 (quoting Transcript of Hearing on 7 July 2010, at 12, The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-312 (July 7, 2010)). 
163 Id. ¶ 81. 
164 Id.  
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the two witnesses who refused to testify because of intimidation and 
fear throughout the trial and that this error contributed to the 
acquittals.165  The ICTY prosecution criticized the Trial Chamber’s 
“fixation” on speedy proceedings—trading fairness for 
expeditiousness.166  Further, the prosecution argued: 
A fair trial is not measured in hours. A fair trial must 
be measured by whether or not the Chamber allowed 
the parties to present their case. In the case of the 
Prosecution, this measurement is to be made on a case 
by case basis recognizing that the prosecution 
represents the interests of victims, justice and the 
international community.167 
The prosecution emphasized that since witness intimidation and fear 
permeated the entire trial, the Trial Chamber’s rejection of requests 
for additional time were unfair, especially given that the time limit 
for the prosecution’s case was set prior to perceiving the extent of 
witness intimidation.168  The prosecution characterized the rush as 
the Trial Chamber “over react[ing] to time pressure.”169  The 
prosecution posited, therefore, that the Trial Chamber’s inflexible 
enforcement of a 125-hour limit on its case, when it requested an 
additional 105 hours, was an abuse of discretion.170   
4. Concluding remarks 
 The prosecution in both Lubanga and Haradinaj made strong 
cases for delaying their respective trials to accommodate special 
needs of witnesses.  The next section details the responses of the two 
Trial Chambers and demonstrates that they disregarded the protests 
by the Lubanga and Haradinaj prosecutions.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
165 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶¶ 14–15.  
166 Id.  
167 The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. 
IT-04-84-A 540-483, Prosecution Appeal Brief (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 21 
(July 17, 2008). 
168 Id. ¶ 18. 
169 Id. ¶ 20.  
170 Id. ¶¶ 17–18. 
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V. PART THREE: THE APPEALS CHAMBERS’ REMEDIES  
A. Haradinaj 
The Haradinaj Appeals Chamber took a strong stance against 
the Trial Chamber in its agreement with the prosecution’s abuse of 
discretion claim.  The appeals judgment, therefore, provided clear 
guidance regarding the conduct of trial chambers in relation to 
balancing expediency with attending to the particular needs of 
witnesses. 
The Appeals Chamber described the context of the Haradinaj 
trial as having an “unprecedented atmosphere of widespread and 
serious witness intimidation that surrounded the trial.”171  The 
Appeals Chamber held that such extreme witness intimidation per se 
undermines a fair trial, as guaranteed in Article 20(1).172  Thus, the 
Appeals Chamber very clearly prioritized the rights of witnesses to 
feel and be protected as a necessary condition to a fair trial.  The 
Appeals Chamber directly addressed the Trial Chamber’s 
discretionary authority to manage trials in order to ensure 
expediency, among other things, and it also stressed that the Trial 
Chamber must attend to the unique needs of each case.173  It stated 
that “what is reasonable in one trial is not automatically reasonable 
in another.”174  This statement has the dual effect of liberalizing the 
limit on a party’s presentation of its case while also restricting such 
flexibility to cases with circumstances that warrant it.175  Thus, the 
Appeals Chamber simultaneously broadened and limited a trial 
chamber’s ability to extend cases beyond its allotted time. 
The Appeals Chamber then criticized the Trial Chamber for 
its “misplaced priority” in putting “undue emphasis” on time limits, 
which reflected its lack of appreciation of the “gravity of the threat 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
171 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 34. 
172 Id. ¶ 35 (“In circumstances of witness intimidation such as this, it is incumbent 
upon a Trial Chamber to do its utmost to ensure that a fair trial is possible. Witness 
intimidation of the type described by the Trial Chamber undermines the 
fundamental objective of the Tribunal, enshrined in Article 20(1).”); see also 
ICTY Statute 20(1) (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of 
procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”). 
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that witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity.”176  The 
Appeals Chamber pointed out that the Trial Chamber was on notice 
that serious threats were being made to witnesses, but it nevertheless 
failed to exercise its powers to ensure the safety of witnesses who 
were at risk for “objectively less important logistical 
considerations.”177  The Appeals Chamber, with the exception of 
Judge Patrick Robinson, quashed the Trial Chamber’s acquittal of 
the three accused and issued a partial re-trial.178 
1. Judge Robinson’s Dissent 
As referenced above, the appeals decision was not 
unanimous.  Judge Robinson disagreed with the Appeals Chamber’s 
invalidation of the Trial Chamber’s discretion:  
[T]he mere fact that the Appeals Chamber would 
have exercised a discretionary power differently is not 
a sufficient basis for invalidating the Trial Chamber’s 
exercise of that discretion, provided the Trial 
Chamber has properly exercised the discretion; a 
certain deference must be given to a Trial Chamber in 
issues relating to the management of the trial.179 
This deference, Judge Robinson argued, is due because the Trial 
Chamber, not the Appeals Chamber, has an “organic familiarity with 
the day-to-day conduct of the parties and the practical demands of 
the case.”180 
Judge Robinson noted that the Trial Chamber extended the 
prosecution’s case three times and left open the possibility for a 
fourth extension should the prosecution demonstrate a likelihood that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
176 Id. ¶ 40. 
177 Id. ¶ 43. 
178 Id. ¶ 50. 
179 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30 (Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Patrick Robinson, VI(A) ¶ 2).  
180 Id. ¶ 5, quoting Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir et al., Case No. IT-04-80-
AR73.1, Decision on Radivoje Mileti?’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision on Joinder of Accused,  ¶ 4 (Jan. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. S. 
Miloševi?, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the 
Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, ¶ 9 (Nov. 1, 
2004). 
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the relevant witness testimony would actually result.181  Thus, 
regarding the issue of granting the prosecution more time, the 
Appeals Chamber analyzed whether the Trial Chamber’s actions had 
done too little.  Judge Robinson criticized this approach and argued 
that doing “too little” is a discretionary privilege that is not to be 
second-guessed, and the existence of three extensions negated an 
abuse of discretion claim in this case.182  Absent an error that rises to 
the level of abuse because it is so unfair or unreasonable, which 
Judge Robinson insisted was not present in this case, the Appeals 
Chamber may not invalidate the Trial Chamber’s discretion.183 
The obvious point of contention between the Majority and 
the Dissent is whether the Trial Chamber’s actions could be 
characterized as fair and reasonable.  The Majority said that they 
were not, given the extenuating circumstances of extreme witness 
intimidation and fear.  The Dissent stated that it was an impossible 
call to make because the Trial Chamber did take some action in the 
right direction.  The split reflects the difficulty in overturning a trial 
chamber’s discretionary decisions and perhaps sheds light on why 
the Lubanga Appeals Chamber did not address the issue at all. 
B. Lubanga 
Although the Lubanga Appeals Chamber ultimately reversed 
the stay of proceedings, it did little to clarify how the Trial Chamber 
ought to handle protection disagreements in the future.  The Appeals 
Chamber stated the following:  
The Prosecutor commingles arguments against the 
Impugned Decision with challenges to the Trial 
Chamber’s prior orders . . . [but] neither the first nor 
the Second Order of Disclosure is on appeal.  The 
Appeals Chamber, therefore, does not address the 
specific challenges to the First and Second Orders of 
Disclosure and restricts its consideration to whether 
the Prosecutor refused to comply with the orders of 
the Trial Chamber and the propriety of the Trial 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
181 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30 (Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Patrick Robinson, VI(A), ¶ 4).  
182 Id. ¶¶ 5–7.  
183 Id. ¶ 8.  
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Chamber’s decision to impose a stay of proceedings 
as a consequence.184 
The Appeals Chamber characterized the prosecution’s 
actions as deliberate and willful non-compliance, in contrast with the 
prosecution’s justification that it was acting within the statutory 
framework pursuant to its duty to protect witnesses.185  Furthermore, 
the Appeals Chambers said that the Trial Chamber’s orders must 
prevail if there are disagreements in matters relating to protection: 
“The Prosecutor (or other parties or participants) must follow the 
orders of the Trial Chamber when it comes to issues of 
protection.”186  The prosecution, therefore, does not have an 
independent statutory obligation that supersedes the Trial Chamber’s 
duty to ensure a fair trial.  Rather, “the Trial Chamber, subject only 
to the powers of the Appeals Chamber, is the ultimate guardian of a 
fair and expeditious trial.”187 
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the second component of 
the prosecution’s argument, that the stay of the proceedings was a 
disproportionate response to its actions.  The Appeals Chamber 
decided that the Trial Chamber erred in issuing a stay of the 
proceedings without first using sanctions to obtain compliance.  
Thus, it was on the proportionality issue that the prosecution 
prevailed.   
The Appeals Chamber did not address the merit of the Trial 
Chamber’s orders because the issue was not ripe.  Additionally, it 
declined to analyze the legitimacy of the prosecution’s numerous 
attempts to protest the orders of the Trial Chamber: “The Appeals 
Chamber need not consider whether and to what extent parties may 
seek reconsideration of orders of a Trial Chamber or variations of 
time limits for consideration of such orders.”188  The Appeals 
Chamber, therefore, did not address the cause of the non-compliance 
(i.e. whether the Trial Chamber’s independent assessment of the 
protection issue and its discretionary order of the limited disclosure 
were proper), nor did it advise the Trial Chamber on how to manage 
objections to its orders or even whether those objections were 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
184 Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶ 45.  
185 Id. ¶ 46. 
186 Id. ¶ 50. 
187 Id. ¶ 47. 
188 Id. ¶ 48. 
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appropriate by the prosecution.  While the Appeals Chamber would 
have overstepped its bounds had it addressed at great length the 
issues arising from the content of the Trial Chamber’s orders, 
namely witness protection, it nonetheless could have framed its 
decision in a way that would have provided more guidance to the 
Trial Chamber and the prosecution. 
The Appeals Chamber did make clear, albeit without 
elaboration, that when differences of opinion occur regarding 
protection, the only opinion that matters is the Trial Chamber’s.  
With this assertion, the Appeals Chamber diminished the 
significance of witness protection.  Since the Trial Chamber can 
trump the opinions of the court’s parties and participants, entities 
like the VWU and the prosecution are left powerless in the case of 
disagreement.  The prosecution’s witnesses, and all other individuals 
involved in the proceedings, are therefore left without an advocate 
and remain defenseless against the authority of the Trial Chamber.  
And although the Chamber assumes responsibility for these 
witnesses, the Chamber may not have access to the most up-to-date 
safety and security information concerning witnesses or individuals 
involved in the proceedings.  Nor will the Chamber necessarily 
possess the requisite expertise to make safety and security judgments 
independently, as it did with Intermediary 143.  If a trial chamber is 
allowed to make discretionary decisions concerning the safety and 
security of individuals involved with a court in a unilateral manner, 
witnesses and others may be reluctant or afraid to initiate contact 
with a court or to continue cooperating with a court if already 
involved.  As the Appeals Chamber in Haradinaj held, a fair trial is 
impossible if witnesses face intimidation or fear.189 
It is important to note that the Appeals Chamber not only 
avoided the issue of the underlying cause of the non-compliance, but 
it also failed to address the proper role of the VWU and when it 
ought to be consulted.  Thus, the Appeals Chamber indirectly 
condoned the Trial Chamber’s discretionary decision to amend an 
order of disclosure without first consulting the VWU.  The fact that 
the Trial Chamber did consult the VWU at the prosecution’s 
prompting indicated that this was a proper step, yet the Appeals 
Chamber did not highlight the Trial Chamber’s error in the timing of 
this consultation.  Thus, the Appeals Chamber overlooked the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
189 Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 35. 
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recklessness of the Trial Chamber’s unilateral amendment of the 
disclosure order.  
The Appeals Chamber might have chosen not to address the 
above-noted issues in its decision for several reasons.  First, the 
prosecution did not make any specific allegations that Intermediary 
143 had been threatened, nor did it present any documentation that 
Intermediary 143 feared for his life and that of his family (at least 
not as a matter of public record).  Along the same lines, the 
accusations against the defense resource person were informal and 
unsubstantiated.  Thus, the protection issue seemed far more 
hypothetical in Lubanga than it was in Haradinaj, where the 
witnesses had shown the Court documented instances of 
intimidation.  Perhaps the Appeals Chamber agreed with the defense 
team that the prosecution’s deliberate disobedience was “not because 
of insurmountable external obstacles,”190 but rather a result of the 
prosecution’s “personal interpretation of his obligations and of the 
interests at stake.”191  Whatever the reason, the lack of resolution of 
these issues increases the probability that they are likely to re-
emerge in the future. 
VI. PART FOUR: CONCLUSION 
The Lubanga stay and the Haradinaj acquittals resulted from 
protection issues concerning individuals involved in the respective 
court proceedings.  In both cases, the trial chambers were hasty and 
dismissive of protection concerns and used their discretion to 
prioritize expediency over the careful analysis of concerns voiced by 
individuals who felt unsafe as a result of their involvement with the 
respective courts.  As described earlier in this article, there are 
numerous causes of the lengthy proceedings at the ICC and ICTY, 
and delays appear to plague the pre-trial stage most of all.  It is 
dangerous, therefore, for judges to import the pressure to speed up 
trials to the context of witness protection, a vital component of the 
credibility and feasibility of international criminal trials.   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
190 Lubanga Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, ¶ 38. 
191 Id. ¶ 39, quoting The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Defence Response 
to the Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s 
decision of 8 July 2010 to stay the proceedings for abuse of process, ¶ 69 (Aug. 9, 
2010).  
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The Haradinaj Appeals Chamber took an extreme position in 
favor of witness’s rights and provided guidance to the Trial Chamber 
concerning the importance of proceedings that are free of witness 
intimidation and fear.  The Appeals Chamber criticized decisions 
that were impatient with witnesses’ needs and skeptical of the 
likelihood of witnesses testifying if given more time.  The Lubanga 
Appeals Chamber focused on defining the prosecution’s actions as 
non-compliant without addressing the underlying reasons for its non-
compliance.  Ignoring the reasons for non-compliance was a mistake 
because the Appeals Chamber failed to resolve whether the Trial 
Chamber was proper in dismissing controversial protection issues 
without allowing parties to fully present their views.  
Notwithstanding the failure of the Lubanga Appeals Chamber to 
address it directly, the lesson to be learned from both Haradinaj and 
Lubanga is that trial chambers must set aside the priority of 
expediency and allow themselves to be checked by parties and 
participants of the court regarding matters of witness protection. 
Lubanga and Haradinaj demonstrate that expediency is a 
major preoccupation of international tribunals to the extent that it 
influences judges’ assessments concerning the safety and security of 
those involved with the courts.  These two cases are not, however, 
isolated examples.  Rather, they are the most recent cases of a 
longer-standing trend, in which the protection of those involved in 
court proceedings is trumped by other concerns.  For example, in 
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber denied a request to grant anonymity to witnesses, stating 
that “the rights of the accused are made the first consideration, and 
the need to protect victims and witnesses is a secondary one.”192  The 
protection of witnesses was considered secondary, so the possibility 
for complete non-disclosure of witness’s identities was not permitted 
absent exceptional circumstances.193  The court’s rationale was that 
non-disclosure of witnesses was incompatible with an accused’s 
rights.194   
The risk of so openly discounting the importance of witness 
protection is that potential witnesses may hesitate to participate in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
192 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, Decision on Motion by 
Prosecution for Protective Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 20 (July 3, 2000). 
193 Id. ¶¶ 23, 26. 
194 Id. 
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international criminal trials.195  The danger in not guaranteeing the 
safety of endangered witnesses is that the trials will not exist without 
voluntary witness participation.196  Encouraging voluntary 
participation is especially important given the “impossibility” of 
enforcing compulsory testimony, a problem cited by the ICTR,197 
which is also a difficulty experienced by other tribunals.198   
The mistake at hand is in viewing witness protection in 
absolute terms and without patience.  This article argues that 
alternatives to complete non-disclosure exist to ensure the safety of 
witnesses without diminishing the rights of the accused.  The full 
implementation of witness protective measures, including witness 
relocation, if necessary, is one such way to provide for witnesses’ 
safety prior to disclosures.  In this way, not only are the rights of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
195 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, Motion for Protective 
Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶¶ 10–11, (Jan. 10, 2000), quoted in Prosecutor v. 
Radoslav Brdanin &Momir Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for 
Protective Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 8 (July 3, 2000) (“In the past two years, 
there have been increasing instances involving interference with and intimidation 
of Tribunal witnesses, including breaches and violations of witness protection 
orders (including non-disclosure orders) and other security measures. The 
situations range from witnesses having their lives threatened, to repeated instances 
of witness statements that have been disclosed to accused and their counsel being 
published in the media or otherwise made public (despite the existence of non-
disclosure orders), to numerous threatening telephone calls, to loss of jobs or job 
opportunities, to witnesses’ general fear and apprehension that they or their 
families will be harmed or harassed or otherwise suffer if they testify or co-operate 
with the Tribunal.  In light of these past breaches of confidentiality and other 
serious problems, and their effect on victims and witnesses, the Prosecutor has 
grave concerns that the safety of witnesses, their willingness to testify and the 
integrity of these proceedings will be substantially jeopardised if witnesses’ 
identities, whereabouts and statements are prematurely disclosed in circumstances 
where they cannot be protected. The Prosecutor submits that the requested 
protective measures greatly assist in minimising these concerns.”). 
196 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talic, Motion for Protective 
Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 9 (Jan. 10, 2000), quoted in Prosecutor v. 
Radoslav Brdanin &Momir Talic, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for 
Protective Measures, Case No. IT-99-36, ¶ 9 (July 3, 2000) (“If witnesses will not 
come forward or if witnesses refuse or are otherwise unwilling to testify, there is 
little evidence to present. Threats, harassment, violence, bribery and other 
intimidation, interference and obstruction of justice are serious problems, for both 
the individual witnesses and the Tribunal’s ability to accomplish its mission.”). 
197 Göran Sluiter, The ICTY and the Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 
962, 965–66 (2005). 
198 See, e.g., Haradinaj et al. Judgment, supra note 135, ¶ 27. 
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accused preserved, but a message is sent to witnesses and others 
involved in international courts: courts will do everything in their 
power to protect individuals, ensuring that there will be no reason to 
regret getting involved in the international criminal justice system.  
Defendants also stand to benefit from courts prioritizing witness 
protection, as they are less likely to suffer delays that result from 
appeals concerning such witness protection matters.  Finally, the 
courts, by attending more diligently to their witnesses’ needs and by 
involving parties and participants in witness protection decisions, 
will enhance their legitimacy and encourage greater cooperation 
among current and potential witnesses.  All that is needed in order to 
implement this alternative is patience from judges, parties, and the 
general public and understanding for the delays that may result from 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































*Italicized text denotes an absence of decision or action as of 7/12/11, and these data points 
are excluded from average calculations. 
 
 
 
